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Extended Abstract. Harsanyi [“Cardinal welfare,individualistic ethics,
and interpersonal comparisons of utility”, Journal of Political Economy,
1955] used expected utility theory to provide two axiomatizations of weighted
utilitarian rules. Sen [“Welfare inequalities and Rawlsian axiomatics”, The-
ory and Decision,1976] has argued that Harsanyi has not,in fact,axioma-
tized utilitarianism because he has misapplied expected utility theory. Specif-
ically,Sen has argued that von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility the-
ory is an ordinal theory and,therefore,any increasing transform of a von
Neumann–Morgenstern utility function is a satisfactory representation of a
preference relation over lotteries satisfying the expected utility axioms. In
other words,von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility is ordinal. How-
ever,Harsanyi’s version of utilitarianism requires a cardinal theory of utility
in which only von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions are acceptable
representations of preferences. Sen’s informal discussion of these issues has
been formalized by Weymark [“A Reconsideration of the Harsanyi–Sen de-
bate on utilitarianism’,in Elster and Roemer,eds., Interpersonal Compar-
isons of Well-Being,1991].
Broome [Weighing Goods,1991,and “Can there be a preference-based
utilitarianism?”,forthcoming in Salles and Weymark,eds., Justice, Political
Liberalism, and Utilitarianism: Themes from Harsanyi and Rawls] has ar-
gued that von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory is cardinal in
the relevant sense needed to support Harsanyi’s utilitarian conclusions. His
basic point is that a preference binary relation is not a complete description
of preferences in the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory. Rather,the prefer-
ence relation needs to be supplemented by a binary operation,and it is this
operation that makes the theory cardinal.
Broome does not provide a formal argument in support of this conclu-
sion. Instead,he argues by analogy with how measurement theory constructs
scales for weighing objects (and for measuring temperature). To construct
1a measure of weight,one starts with a set of objects S,a binary relation  
on S (weighs at least as much as),and a concatentation operation ◦ from
S × S to S (the objects x and y are combined to create a new object x ◦ y,
e.g.,by placing them in the same pan of a balancing scale). A real-valued
function w: S → R is a weight measurement scale if w both represents  
and w(x ◦ y)=w(x)+w(y).
I use formal measurement theory to critically evaluate Broome’s argu-
ment. In measurement theory,a relational structure is a set S together with
one or more relations on S. (Binary operators on S × S can be equivalently
thought of as ternary relations on S.) Constructing a measurement scale
amounts to establishing a homomorphism between an empirical relational
structure and a numerical one.
For example,the empirical relational structure used to measure weight is
W =  S; ;◦ ,where S,  ,and ◦ are as deﬁned above. The usual practice
in the theory of weight is to associate the numerical structure N =  R;≥;+ 
with W. The homormorphism is a function f that maps S into R in such a
way that the properties of   and ◦ are preserved by ≥ and +. Such a function
is unique up to a similarity transform,from which it is often asserted that
weight is a cardinal concept. However,as noted by Krantz,Luce,Suppes,
and Tversky [Foundations of Measurement, Volume I,1971] the choice of an
additive representation in this case is simply a matter of convenience. For
example,we could instead use ¯ N =  R;≥;×  as the numerical structure. If
this is done,then we would want to have f(x ◦ y)=f(x)f(y),rather than
f(x ◦ y)=f(x)+f(y),as would be the case with N.
In von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory,the empirical re-
lational structure is E =  L; ;α,α ∈ (0,1) ,where L is a set of lotteries
on a set of alternatives,   is a binary relation on L,and each α is a binary
operator on L×Lthat maps the ordered pair of lotteries (p,q) to the lot-
tery αp+(1−αq). [Strictly speaking,von Neumann and Morgenstern work
with a set of ‘abstract utilities’ U,rather than a set of lotteries. I follow the
subsequent literature in describing their theory in terms of lotteries.]
Broome never makes clear that E is the empirical relational structure for
expected utility theory corresponding to W for weight. Nor does he explain
why measuring weight is analogous to measuring utility in risky situations.
Given that the operators ◦ and α are diﬀerent,it is not obvious that the
analogy is a good one.
Broome’s argument implicitly assumes that the numerical relational struc-
ture corresponding to E is V =  R;≥;α∗,α ∗ ∈ (0,1) ,where α∗ is the convex
2operator that maps the pair of numbers (a,b)i n t oα∗a +( 1− α∗)b. With
this numerical relational structure,in order for α∗ to preserve the structure
of α,a representation of   would be acceptable if and only if it is a von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Such a representation is unique up
to an increasing aﬃne tranform,from which it might be claimed that von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory is cardinal in the sense required by util-
itarianism.
However,as with the measurement of weight,the choice of the numeri-
cal relational structure in the preceding discussion has been chosen because
the operators that appear in the numerical relational structure appear to
be ‘natural’ analogues of the operators that appear in the empirical rela-
tional structure. This is perfectly acceptable in positive theories in which
one is merely trying to work out the implications of expected utility theory
for choice behaviour. However,it is not a satisfactory basis for choosing
a numerical relational structure when the objective is to provide a norma-
tive foundation for utilitarianism. What is missing is an argument that the
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility representations of   obtained using the
numerical relational structure V (rather than the representations obtained
using binary operators diﬀerent from the α∗) are the ethically-relevant ones
for making the interpersonal comparisons of utility diﬀerences required by
utilitariansm. It is simply not possible to do this without enriching the the-
ory in some way that goes beyond what is in the von Neumann-Morgenstern
formulation of expected utility theory.
These observations show that Sen’s initial criticism of Harsanyi can be
extended to the more complete description of expected utility theory that
is obtained by using the mixture operators α in addition to the preference
relation  .
In the full version of this article,these arguments will be spelled out more
formally and in greater detail. Further examples taken from the measure-
ment theory literature will be used to illustrate the arguments (e.g.,how
probabilities are measured in Savage’s theory). There will also be discus-
sion of versions of Broome’s argument that have appeared in the work of
Binmore [Game Theory and the Social Contract: Volume 1,1994] and Risse
[“Harsanyi’s ‘Utilitarian Theorem’ and Utilitarianism”, Noˆ us,2002]. An al-
ternative approach to cardinal utility that uses degrees of preference (which
has been advanced by Harsanyi in unpublished correspondence) will also be
considered.
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